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 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6478 
 
CHURCHVILLE-CHILI CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
 
                                                 Employer, 
 
           -and- 
 
CHURCHVILLE-CHILI BUS DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, 
 
                                                          Intervenor/Incumbent. 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;1 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
                                                     
1 This unit has been represented by the Churchville-Chili Bus Drivers Association, which 
notified PERB, by letter dated October 3, 2017, that it disclaims any interest in further 
representing the unit. 
Certification - C-6478 - 2 - 
 
 
 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All regular Drivers of the District and the Bus Monitors and Bus 
Attendants. 
   
   Excluded: All others as defined by the Act. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union.  The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  December 18, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
                                                                
                                                                       
 
  
STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION (ATU), LOCAL 1179, 
 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
   -and-                                                 CASE NO. TIA2017-014 
 
MTA BUS COMPANY, 
 
                                                 Respondent. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS, LLP (BETH M. MARGOLIS, ESQ., of 
counsel) for Petitioner 
 
PROSKAUER ROSE, LLP (NEIL H. ABRAMSON, ESQ., of counsel) for 
Respondent 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
This matter comes to us by reason of a report and recommendation of the 
Director of Conciliation (Director) regarding a petition for interest arbitration filed by the 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1179 (ATU) under §209.5 of the Public Employees’ 
Fair Employment Act (Act) and §205.15 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) with respect 
to an impasse in contract negotiations between ATU and the MTA Bus Company 
(MTA).   
 In his report and recommendation, the Director concludes that a voluntary 
resolution of the contract negotiations between ATU and the MTA cannot be effected 
and recommends that the impasse be referred to a public interest arbitration panel.   
 The MTA has not filed an objection to the Director’s report and recommendation 
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pursuant to §205.15(b) of the Rules. 
 Following our review of the Director’s report and recommendation, we hereby 
certify that a voluntary resolution of the contract negotiations between ATU and the 
MTA cannot be effected and we, therefore, refer the impasse involving these parties to 
a public interest arbitration panel. 
 SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 18, 2017 
  Albany, New York        
   
      
                    
 
 
               
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
________________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
NEW YORK STATE COURT CLERKS ASSOCIATION, 
 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-35805 
 
- and - 
 
STATE OF NEW YORK UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM 
 
Respondent. 
 
________________________________________________ 
 
PITTA, LLP (BRUCE J. COOPER and JOSEPH BONOMO, of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
 
LAUREN DESOLE, ESQ., DIRECTOR OF HUMAN RESOURCES (JON L. 
DUELTGEN and CAROLYN GRIMALDI, of counsel), for Respondent 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on what we deem to be a motion for leave to file 
interlocutory exceptions pursuant to §213.4 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) by the 
State of New York-Unified Court System (UCS) to an August 3, 2017 letter 
determination of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1  In her letter, the ALJ declined to 
grant UCS’s pre-hearing motion to dismiss an improper practice charge filed by the New 
York State Court Clerks Association (Association) or to defer the improper practice 
proceeding to collateral litigation and/or arbitration.  The ALJ’s letter scheduled a 
                                            
1 Although UCS’s exceptions state that they are filed “as of right pursuant to Section 
213.2 of the Rules,” id. at n. 1, counsel for UCS conceded at oral argument, that, as 
there had been no final decision in the case, the appeal was interlocutory in nature.  Tr 
at 4.  
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hearing, should the case not be resolved beforehand, on January 10, 2018, to, in part, 
“provide the parties time to assess their progress in the other pending actions and 
determine what effect, if any, those have on the case before PERB.”2   
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE INTERLOCUTORY EXCEPTIONS 
UCS makes five arguments, which it contends establish extraordinary 
circumstances warranting the grant of leave and to support its contention that the ALJ 
erred in her letter determination.  First, UCS excepts to the ALJ’s refusal to dismiss the 
charge, on the ground that the ALJ and this Board lack subject matter jurisdiction over 
contractual claims and claims arising under statutes other than the Public Employees’ 
Fair Employment Act (Act), and/or are reviewable only under Article 78 of the Civil 
Practice Law and Rules.  UCS contends in its second exception that the ALJ erred in 
relying on the “processing of the case on the pleading” by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) as wholly dispositive in denying its 
motion to dismiss the charge for failure to state a claim.3  UCS asserts in its third 
exception that the ALJ erred in refusing to consider UCS’s affirmative defenses as set 
forth in its pre-hearing motion to dismiss without specifying grounds for refusing to do 
so.  In its fourth exception, UCS claims that the “ALJ failed to defer, in whole or in part, 
to virtually identical claims already pending in state court or that [the Association] 
submitted to arbitration, and failing to articulate any basis therefore [sic].”4  Finally, 
UCS’s fifth exception alleges that the ALJ erred in directing UCS to respond to the 
Association’s requests for information, on the ground that the documents relate to the 
                                            
2 Letter Determination at 1-2. 
3 Exception No. 2, quoting letter determination at 1. 
4 Exception No. 4. 
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pending Article 78 proceeding, and that the ALJ “is not only permitting [the Association] 
to evade established prohibitions against pre-litigation discovery but actually facilitating 
the same.”5 
The Association filed a response supporting the ALJ’s letter determination, and 
asserting that the exceptions were untimely filed and served. 
Oral argument was held before the Board on November 6, 2017. 
FACTS 
The charge alleges that Court Clerk Judy Torres-Albert (Torres) was 
discriminated and retaliated against for engaging in protected activity in violation of 
§§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act.  The charge further alleges that UCS subsequently 
violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act by refusing to produce information relevant to a 
potential contractual grievance about the interpretation, application or alleged violation 
of a provision of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.  Because of the 
procedural context of the case, we assume the following allegations in the charge are 
true for the purposes of determining the motion to file an interlocutory appeal of the 
ALJ’s letter determination. 
On March 3, 2017, Torres refused her direct supervisor’s direction to rewrite the 
performance evaluation of another bargaining unit member in retaliation for that 
member’s filing a grievance and told the supervisor that she would inform the 
Association of his directive.6  The same day, Torres communicated with the Association 
regarding this incident, and the Association’s Second Vice President sent an e-mail to 
                                            
5 Exception No. 5. 
6 Other allegedly protected activity included Torres’s communicating regarding this 
situation in an online group consisting of approximately 600 union members.   
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Torres’s direct supervisor protesting his pressure on Torres to change the evaluation.7  
Ten days later, on March 13, 2017, Torres’s direct supervisor extended her probationary 
period by another 40 days.8  Two weeks later, on March 27, 2017, Torres was 
terminated from her probationary position as Principal Court Clerk and returned to her 
prior position as an Associate Court Clerk, which the Association contends was done in 
retaliation for her protected activity.   
On April 4, 2017, the Association submitted a written request for information 
regarding demotion of court clerks in probationary periods.  On April 12, 2017, the 
Association, through counsel, submitted a further request for information “re: Judy 
Torres Grievance.”  On April 14, 2017, the Association filed a grievance asserting that 
UCS’s termination of Torres from her probationary position violated the parties’ 
collective bargaining agreement’s management rights9 and discipline provisions.10  That 
grievance was denied at Step 1 on May 3, 2017.11  The grievance was again denied at 
Step 2.12 
On May 18, 2017, UCS denied the April 4 request in a letter by Lauren DeSole, 
then UCS’s Director of Human Resources, on the basis that probationary periods, 
“including but not limited to their extension and/or termination thereof,” are governed 
                                            
7 Charge, Ex B. 
8 Charge, Ex C. 
9 Ans, Ex 1.  The relevant portion of the parties’ Agreement is found at Charge, Ex A, 
Art 5 (“Except as expressly limited by other provisions of this Agreement, all of the 
authority, rights and responsibilities possessed by the State are retained by it, including 
but not limited to, . . . the right to promote, discipline or discharge employees in 
accordance with law and the provisions of this Agreement.”    
10 Charge, Ex A, Art 23. 
11 Ans, Ex 1. 
12 Id.   
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solely by the Rules of the Chief Judge, and are thus not subject to the grievance 
procedure.13  DeSole’s letter pointed out that Torres had been provided with a copy of 
her personnel file, “which may contain information/documentation relevant to your 
inquiry,” and also that a response would be sent under separate cover to the request for 
information and documents “re: Judy Torres Grievance.”14   
Also on May 18, 2017, UCS responded in a letter by Carolyn Grimaldi, to the 
April 12 request for information submitted by the Association’s counsel.15  Grimaldi’s 
letter stated that because “the allegations set forth in the grievance do not give rise to 
any cognizable claim under any provision of the Agreement, the information being 
sought is neither necessary nor relevant to the [Association’s] investigation of any 
grievance,” and therefore denied the request.16  Like DeSole’s letter, Grimaldi’s letter 
referred the Association to the hard copy of Torres’s personnel file that UCS had 
provided her directly. 
The instant charge was filed on June 16, 2017.  Two weeks later, on June 30, the 
Association filed a petition pursuant to Article 78 captioned New York State Court Clerks 
Assn, et anon, v. New York State et al, Index No. 155967/2017 in Supreme Court, New 
York County.  The “Fifth Cause of Action” asserts that “Section 209-a (1) of the [Act] 
makes it unlawful to discriminate or retaliate against an employee for engaging in 
                                            
13 Answer, Ex 4. 
14 Id. 
15 Charge, Ex G. 
16 Id.  Grimaldi’s letter denied that Article 5, Management Rights, provided “any 
independent basis for a contract grievance.”  The letter also states that the disciplinary 
procedure in the Agreement does not apply to probationary employees, and, like 
DeSole’s letter, that the probationary periods and termination thereof are governed 
solely by the Rules of the Chief Judge, and therefore “cannot be challenged under any 
provision of the Agreement.”  Id at 2.   
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protected activity,” and “Respondents unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against 
Ms. Torres in violation of Section 209-a (1) when it terminated her probation and 
demoted her for (i) refusing to falsify a business record with respect to the [co-worker’s] 
evaluation; (ii) posting her intention of filing complaints for sexual harassment and racial 
discrimination on the Facebook Group page; (iii) requesting the assistance of the Union 
to file a grievance over the Employer’s aforementioned conduct; and (iv) reporting [her 
supervisor’s] serious and sexual harassment in the Courthouse to OIG.”17  
On August 3, 2017, after holding a conference in this matter, the ALJ issued the 
letter determination at issue.  First, the ALJ denied UCS’s motions to dismiss the 
charge: 
To the extent that it asserts failure to state a claim that has 
already been resolved by the Director’s processing the case on 
the pleading.  To the extent that the motion asserts that the 
Charging Party would not be able to establish its prima facie 
case at hearing based on the facts provided, I disagree with that 
conclusion, especially under the favorable standard which must 
be applied to evaluating a Motion to Dismiss before hearing.  
Regarding what are affirmative defenses, I am not entertaining 
those as a threshold matter in the context of a Motion to Dismiss 
before hearing.  Additionally, as to the last point, this case is not 
appropriate for deferral as to the (a) and (c) charges, and I see 
no source of right in the CBA on which to defer the (d) and the 
(e).  The fact that the aggrieved has brought actions in other fora 
does not, alone, divest PERB of its jurisdiction.18 
  
The ALJ then set a hearing date of January 10, 2018, stating that “[w]hile that 
scheduling is a function of my calendar, it will also provide the parties time to assess 
their progress in the other pending actions and determine what effect, if any, those have 
                                            
17 Response to Exceptions, Ex 4 at ¶¶ 67-68. 
18 Letter determination at 1. 
Case No. U-35805  -7- 
 
 
 
on the cases before PERB.”19  She then memorialized the terms of a proposed 
settlement.  Finally, she stated that the information request would be responded to, 
either by producing responsive documents, or by attesting to the non-existence of any 
such documents.  Both parties agree that, as UCS states in its Brief in Support of 
Exceptions, that “the undersigned counsel already represented at the status conference 
that there are no records on minorities’ extension of probation, nor would any such 
records be possessed in easily searchable form.”20  At oral argument, counsel for the 
Association agreed, stating that at the conference UCS “counsel represented in so 
many words that the information [the Association is] seeking doesn’t exist, in which case 
Judge Cacavas said ‘Okay, then either prepare an attestation to each of those matters 
that you’re saying don’t exist, or if the information does exist, to expand upon where in 
the record it could be found.”21   
DISCUSSION 
We begin with the threshold question of whether UCS’s exceptions are timely 
filed and served.  Pursuant to §213.4(a) of the Rules, a motion seeking leave to file 
interlocutory exceptions must be filed with the Board and served on all other parties 
“[w]ithin ten working days after any interim decision, order or ruling” sought to be 
appealed.  Filing is defined under §200.11(a) of the Rules as, in relevant part, “the act of 
mailing to the board, or deposit of the papers enclosed in a properly addressed wrapper 
into the custody of an overnight delivery service for overnight delivery, before the latest 
time designated by the overnight delivery service for overnight delivery.”  Service is 
                                            
19 Id at 1-2. 
20 UCS Brief at 15.   
21 Tr at 48. 
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defined under §200.11(b) as, again in relevant part, “the act of mailing to a party, or 
deposit of the papers enclosed in a properly addressed wrapper into the custody of an 
overnight delivery service for overnight delivery, before the latest time designated by the 
overnight delivery service for overnight delivery.”   
The documentary evidence provided by UCS establishes that it received the 
ALJ’s letter determination on August 4, 2017.  The documentary evidence further 
establishes that UCS filed its proposed exceptions with the Board and served its 
exceptions on the Association by delivery to United Parcel Service on August 18, 2017.  
As ten working days from August 4 requires filing and the effectuation of service by 
August 18, 2017, we find filing and service of the exceptions to be timely.    
As we have consistently held, and recently reaffirmed in County of Suffolk, we 
will not grant leave to file interlocutory exceptions to non-final rulings and decisions 
unless the moving party demonstrates extraordinary circumstances.22  As we explained 
in that case: 
The reasoning underlying the extraordinary circumstances 
standard is the recognition that it is far more efficient for the 
Board and the parties to await a final disposition of the 
merits of a charge before examining interim determinations. 
The improvident grant of leave results in unnecessary delays 
in the final resolution of the factual and legal issues raised by 
an improper practice charge or representation petition. As a 
result, the Board has consistently rejected the majority of 
                                            
22 County of Suffolk, 50 PERB ¶3010, 3047 (2017), citing Mt Morris Cent Sch Dist, 26 
PERB ¶3085, 3165-3166 (1993); Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB ¶3050, 3115 (1996); 
Council 82, AFSCME, 32 PERB ¶3040, 3089 (1999); UFT (Grassel), 32 PERB ¶3071, 
3168 (1999); City of Newburgh, 33 PERB ¶3031, 3084 (2000); State of New York 
(Division of Parole), 40 PERB ¶3007, 3019 (2007); Hyde Leadership Charter School-
Brooklyn, 47 PERB ¶3022, 3063 (2014). 
requests for permission to file exceptions.23  
 
In improper practice cases, we have generally denied interlocutory appeals 
except in cases in which we have found “extraordinary circumstances where severe 
prejudice would result” to the party seeking an interlocutory appeal of an ALJ’s interim 
determination or order.24  An alternative phrasing the Board has used to delineate what 
constitutes extraordinary circumstances is that “[a]n interlocutory appeal from rulings by 
an ALJ is properly entertained only if our failure to consider the appeal would result in 
harm to a party which cannot be remedied by our review of the ALJ's final decision and 
order.”25    
Here, UCS has grounded its claim that the letter determination presents 
extraordinary circumstances on several bases.  In its request for oral argument, UCS 
states that: 
Extraordinary circumstances are implicated here, including 
competing and potentially conflicting litigation and arbitration; 
the definition of protected activity under the Taylor Law; 
questions regarding the scope of the jurisdiction of [the] 
Public Employment Relations Board and the issues to be 
determined at hearing, and the adherence to broad statutory 
authority vested in the Chief Administrative Judge to 
administer the Court system as it relates to, inter alia, 
probationary periods. 
        
In its brief in support of its exceptions, UCS reiterates these grounds, and asserts 
that “[w]ithout PERB’s relief by remedying these exceptions at this stage, the parties are 
                                            
23 Id, citing Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB ¶3050, at 3115; State of New York (Division 
of Parole), 40 PERB ¶3007, at 3019; see also NYCTA (Burke), 50 PERB ¶3015, 3061 
(2017); CSEA (Arredondo), 43 PERB ¶3021, 3080-3081 (2010). 
24 UFT (Fearon), 37 PERB ¶3007 (2004); State of New York (UCS), 36 PERB ¶3031, 
(2003). 
25 State of New York (Division of Parole), 25 PERB ¶3007, at 3019-3020 (1992), citing 
United Univ Professions, 19 PERB ¶3009 (1986). 
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faced with extraordinary circumstances wherein a hearing is scheduled on matters 
pending before other fora and outside the scope of PERB’s jurisdiction, and the parties’ 
resources will be squandered.”26 
Finally, UCS argued in its brief, albeit in a footnote, that “[a]s a measure of the 
extraordinary circumstances implicated here, Charging Party has also delivered on 
Torres’[s] threats by dragging [her supervisor’s] name through the mud, openly 
defaming and vilifying [him] and his wife (a New York City Criminal Court Judge) without 
restraint in the New York Post, and commencing an onslaught of litigation against the 
Court System in multiple fora . . .”27  This last ground may be dealt with speedily.  At 
oral argument, counsel for UCS readily acknowledged that neither the exercise by a 
litigant of First Amendment rights, nor the interest of the press in a particular matter 
pending before the courts, an ALJ, or the Board, constitutes an appropriate ground for 
treating that litigant’s case differently than other cases.28  We accept UCS’s withdrawal 
of this alleged ground for finding extraordinary circumstances warranting interlocutory 
appeal to the Board. 
The ruling refusing to defer to the arbitration process not only fails to constitute or 
to contribute to extraordinary circumstances, it does not establish any cognizable 
prejudice.  As the Appellate Division, Fourth Department has recently reaffirmed in 
Buffalo Teachers Federation v New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 
“[n]otably, PERB will defer to an arbitration award only in limited circumstances, and it 
usually does not do so where the charging party alleges a violation of Civil Service Law 
                                            
26 UCS Brief at 2.   
27 UCS Brief at 4, n. 2. 
28 Tr at 18. 
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§209-a(1) (a).”29  Here, as in Buffalo Teachers Federation, the statutory claim does not 
fall within the ambit of PERB’s deferral policy.30   
Similarly, the ALJ’s refusal to defer to the Article 78 proceeding does not 
establish or even contribute to any cognizable prejudice, let alone extraordinary 
circumstances.  Although the Association brought what purports to be a claim under the 
Act as part of its Article 78 proceeding, §205.5(d) of the Act expressly states that the 
Board “shall exercise exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction over” improper practice claims.  
Thus, such claims cannot be heard in the first instance in a judicial forum, and are not 
properly subject to the jurisdiction of the Court hearing the Association’s Article 78 
case.31  Moreover, the improper practice charge was filed prior to the Article 78 
proceeding, and the hearing before the ALJ is scheduled for January 10, 2018.  By 
                                            
29 153 AD3d 1643, 1645 (4th Dept 2017) (citations omitted), citing New York City Trans 
Auth [Bordansky], 4 PERB ¶3031 (1971); State of New York (Division of State Police), 
36 PERB ¶3048, n. 3 (2003); Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga Bd of Cooperative Educ Servs, 
34 PERB ¶3019 (2001); Matter of Addison Cent Sch Dist, 17 PERB ¶3076 (1984). 
30 Id. (finding that PERB properly declined to defer charge under §209-a.1(a) and (d)).  
See also Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 21 
NY3d 255, 265 (2013); Buffalo Teachers Fedn, 153 AD3d at 1645; see also County of 
Rockland v CSEA, 93 AD3d 721, 722 (2d Dept 2012) (Arbitration of grievances not 
barred by PERB’s exclusive improper practice jurisdiction where “grievances do not 
allege that the petitioner committed improper employer practices in violation of Civil 
Service Law §209–a”). 
31 Westchester Co Dept of Pub Safety Police Benevolent Assn, Inc. v Westchester Co, 
35 AD3d 592, 595 (2d Dept 2006) (dismissing Article 78 petition alleging that the 
County committed an improper employer practice in violation of §209–a.1(d)); Peil v 
Beirne, 72 AD3d 1095, 1096 (2d Dept 2010) (In Article 78 proceeding, “[t]he petitioner's 
contention that the [employer] committed an improper labor practice in violation of 
Section 209–a of the [Act] is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Employment 
Relations Board and, thus, cannot be reviewed in this proceeding.”) (citations omitted); 
see generally Zuckerman v Bd of Educ, City Sch Dist of the City of NY, 44 NY2d 336, 
342-343 (1978); Ifill v NYS Court Officers Assn, 655 FSupp2d 382, 392 (SDNY 2009) 
(dismissing pendent state law claim under Act based on PERB’s “exclusive, non-
delegable” jurisdiction). 
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contrast, a motion to dismiss the later-filed Article 78 proceeding is pending, with an oral 
argument date of February 1, 2018.32  As such is the case, no grounds can exist to 
defer to the Article 78 proceeding.33  Thus, no prejudice, severe or otherwise, has been 
established, and no harm that could not be remedied through an appeal of the ALJ’s 
final decision in due course to the Board has been shown.34   
In denying UCS’s motion to dismiss, the ALJ likewise did not create extraordinary 
circumstances warranting an interlocutory appeal.  In Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (Grassel), the Board declined to find that a denial 
of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction presented extraordinary 
circumstances.35  In particular, the Board noted that “[u]nder the Act, PERB has 
jurisdiction to determine whether an employer's invocation of a statutory procedure is 
unlawfully motivated.”36  This observation applies here.  Likewise, the Board in that 
matter held that “[a]n ALJ, in general, is granted considerable discretion with respect to 
the processing of an improper practice charge, including the conduct of a hearing.”37  
Thus, as all the issues raised in the motion to dismiss could be briefed after the hearing 
                                            
32 We take administrative notice of the date of the oral argument as set forth on UCS’s 
e-courts website, visited on December 7, 2017.  
33 Indeed, at oral argument, when asked if UCS disputed that “any ruling on what 
purports to be a Taylor Law cause of action would not have any binding effect on us,” 
UCS counsel agreed “it would not,” and proposed that the improper practice claims be 
reopened ab initio after the resolution of the Article 78 case.  Tr at 9. 
34 County of Erie, 30 PERB ¶3063 (1997), relied upon by UCS, is not to the contrary.  In 
that matter, the Board had before it an improper practice charge over the employer’s 
failure to remit dues to a newly certified employee organization during the period the 
Board’s certification order was under review pursuant to Article 78.  The Board deferred 
to a judicial proceeding that had jurisdiction over the issues under the Act, as the Court 
was reviewing the Board’s order pursuant to §213(a) of the Act.    
35 41 PERB ¶3031 (2008). 
36 Grassel, 41 PERB ¶3031 at 3137. 
37 Id at 3136, citing City of Elmira, 41 PERB ¶3018 (2008). 
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clarifies the facts, no “severe prejudice” or harm that could not be remedied through a 
due course appeal to the Board has been stated.   
Under the circumstances presented herein, the ALJ’s ruling on the information 
requests does not present extraordinary circumstances warranting an interlocutory 
appeal.  The Association’s requests were objected to at the time in letters that stated 
that no grievance was tenable and that responsive documents might be found in the 
hard copy of Torres’s personnel folder that UCS had provided to her.  In its Answer, 
UCS added to these reasons that the production would be unduly burdensome, and 
intimated that some documents requested did not exist, as well as stating that “[t]o the 
extent that [UCS] possessed responsive, relevant, and necessary materials,” the 
personnel file constituted compliance.38  At the conference, as both parties assert, UCS 
expressly stated that many of the documents requested did not exist and could not 
readily be generated.   
The ALJ, in asking UCS to put this response in writing, with specific responses to 
the requests, did not, as far as we can see, prejudice UCS, let alone create 
extraordinary circumstances.  As we have recently reaffirmed,  
For close to four decades, we have held that under the Act 
an employee organization has a general right to receive 
documents and information requested from an employer for 
use by the employee organization in the administration of a 
collectively negotiated agreement including processing a 
grievance and preparing for a grievance hearing and/or 
arbitration. Failure of an employer to produce requested 
information and documents may constitute a violation of both 
                                            
38 Ans, ¶48. 
§§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act.39 
 
We have also long held that: 
 
That duty includes an obligation on the part of the employer 
to provide information relevant to a union's investigation of 
the merits of a grievance. Moreover, an employee 
organization is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to 
examine requested information and documents before 
determining whether to continue to process a grievance, and 
the right to receive information and documents extends after 
a grievance has been processed to arbitration.40 
 
Nothing in this analysis suggests that the opinion of a public employer that the 
grievance is meritless constitutes a ground upon which a public employer may simply 
refuse to respond to a request for information.  The underlying purpose of the right is to 
allow the public employee organization to investigate the merits of the potential 
grievance, make an informed decision whether or not to pursue it, and to, should the 
matter go to arbitration, be able to present the evidence relevant to the merits of the 
grievance.41  The right is, of course, not without limits, which the employer is free to 
assert.  We have long held that: 
the general right to receive requested documents and 
information is subject to three primary limitations: 
reasonableness, which includes the burden on the 
responding party; relevancy; and necessity. This duty may, 
where appropriate, prevail over confidentiality rights under 
statutes other than the Act. In such cases, we have further 
                                            
39 State of New York (DOCCS), 50 PERB ¶3031, 3122 (2017) (quoting State of New 
York (OTDA), 50 PERB ¶3009, 3043 (2017); see also quoting County of Montgomery, 
44 PERB ¶3045, 3134 (2011); Board of Educ, City Sch Dist of the City of Albany, 6 
PERB ¶3012 (1973); Hornell Cent Sch Dist, 9 PERB ¶3032 (1976); City of Rochester, 
29 PERB ¶3070 (1996). 
40 State of New York (DOCCS), 50 PERB ¶3031 at 3122, quoting State of New York 
(OTDA), State of New York (OTDA), 50 PERB ¶3009, at 3043-3044 (citing cases). 
41 See Hamptons Bay Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶3008, 3051 (2008), confd sub 
nom Hamptons Bay Union Free Sch Dist v New York State Pub Empl Relations Bd, 62 
AD3d 1066, 42 PERB ¶7005 (3d Dept 2009).  
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held that prior to refusing to disclose information under the 
Act based upon a claim of confidentiality, a respondent is 
obligated to first engage in good faith negotiations for the 
purpose of reaching an agreed-upon accommodation 
concerning the requested information.42 
 
Moreover, the Board has long held that the rule of reasonableness includes “the 
availability of the information elsewhere, the necessity therefor, the relevancy thereof, 
and, finally, that the information supplied need not be in the form requested as long as it 
satisfies a demonstrated need.”43  We have also long held that the employer is not 
required “to develop information not yet in existence and then to disclose that 
information.”44  
Some, if not all, of these limitations on the right to obtain information were 
asserted by UCS in its Answer and at the conference.  However, the ALJ subsequently 
ordered in her letter determination that UCS specify which requests it had provided 
responsive documents in answer to and which requests no responsive documents 
existed, expressly with the hope that “we may resolve this portion of the Charge.”  The 
ALJ’s letter does not order UCS to produce any of the requested documentation, but 
instead asks that UCS memorialize its responses at the conference before the ALJ.  
Essentially, the ALJ exercised her authority to narrow the issues in dispute pursuant to 
§212.4 of the Rules through an offer of proof as to what requests documents had been 
produced in response to and as to which others, responsive documents did not exist.  
                                            
42State of New York (OTDA), 50 PERB ¶3009, at 3044 (footnotes and quotation marks 
removed; citing and quoting, inter alia, Utica City School Dist, 48 PERB ¶3008 (2015). 
43 Hornell City Sch Dist, 9 PERB ¶3032, 3061 (1976), quoting Bd of Educ, City Sch Dist, 
City of Albany, 6 PERB 3029, 3030 (1973). 
44 New York State Inspection, Sec & Law Enforcement v Kinsella, 197 AD2d 341, 344, 
27 PERB ¶7006 (3d Dept 1994), confg State of New York (GOER), 25 PERB ¶3078 
(1992); see also Town of Evans, 37 PERB ¶3016 (2004). 
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As we reiterated in State of New York (OTDA),45 “requiring the parties to submit offers 
of proof as to not only claims and defenses as to which they bear the burden of proof, 
but their responses to such claims and defenses, does not, absent more, impermissibly 
shift the burden of proof.”46  Rather, “[s]uch a requirement provides the party with an 
opportunity to identify the facts it intends to prove at a hearing.”47  We therefore do not 
find either severe or irremediable prejudice, or other extraordinary circumstances 
warranting an interlocutory appeal.    
The remainder of the grounds asserted to constitute extraordinary circumstances 
all suffer from the same flaw: they assume that the ALJ, in scheduling a hearing, 
intended to allow the case to proceed not just on the claims under the Act, but on all the 
collateral issues, such as the sexual harassment and racial discrimination claims, and 
on retaliation and discrimination claims based on activity protected not under the Act but 
under various other statutes.  We find nothing in the ALJ’s letter determination indicating 
that she will not limit the issues litigated at the hearing to claims that arise under the Act.  
The ALJ did not indicate that all claims asserted in the charge were cognizable under 
the Act.  Rather, she merely indicates that the charge does state a claim.  The letter 
determination memorializes the ALJ’s denial of the motion to dismiss, a settlement 
proposal that was open as of the date of the letter, and schedules a hearing.  In 
scheduling the hearing, the ALJ expressly advises the parties “to assess their progress 
in the other pending actions and determine what effect, if any, those have on the cases 
                                            
45 50 PERB ¶3009.   
46 Id, at 3042-3043.   
47 50 PERB ¶3009, at 3043, quoting Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, 42 PERB 
¶3023, 3090 (2009). 
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before PERB.”  Simply put, it is clear in this context that the ALJ intended to convey that 
case to be heard at the hearing would be narrowed to claims under the Act.  Although it 
would be clear error for the ALJ to entertain claims beyond the scope of those pleaded 
under the Act, a letter memorializing a conference at which settlement was not ruled 
out, and which hints that the effect of the other claims is yet to be addressed, does not 
suggest that the ALJ was inclined toward such error.   
Accordingly, the motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal must be, and 
hereby is, denied. 
DATED:  December 18, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
 
 
 
  STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
______________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE VILLAGE 
OF WAPPINGERS FALLS, 
 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-35184 
- and - 
 
MATT ALEXANDER, MAYOR AND VILLAGE OF 
WAPPINGERS FALLS, 
 
Respondents. 
______________________________________________ 
 
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN K. GRANT (JOHN K. GRANT, ESQ., of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
 
WALLACE & WALLACE, LLP (PAUL ACKERMANN, ESQ., 
of counsel), for Respondent 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on a motion filed by Matt Alexander, Mayor, and the 
Village of Wappingers Falls (collectively, Village), seeking leave to file interlocutory 
exceptions to a letter ruling by the Assistant Director of the Office of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) dated October 19, 2017.1  In the 
letter, the Assistant Director confirmed that Keith P. Byron, Esq., is no longer 
representing the Charging Party and that John K. Grant, Esq., has been substituted as 
counsel for the Charging Party.  
EXCEPTIONS 
 The Village argues that the Board should grant leave to file interlocutory 
exceptions because “the legal representation of the Charging Party in this matter has 
                                            
1 Attachment to motion seeking leave to file interlocutory exceptions.   
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been called into question.”2  Specifically, the Village alleges that a conflict exists 
preventing Attorney Byron from representing the Charging Party due to his relationship 
with Carl Calabrese, the Commissioner of the Village’s Police Department.  Byron is 
counsel in a matter pending in Dutchess County Supreme Court, in which Calabrese is 
a party.  The Village alleges that Calabrese is both a witness in this case and the 
subject of allegations in the improper practice charge, where Byron previously 
represented the Charging Party.  The Village alleges that Grant shares the same 
conflict as Byron because the two are “interchangeable” on matters involving the 
Charging Party.3  It argues that neither should be permitted to continue representing the 
Charging Party in the improper practice proceeding.  The Village requests that the 
Board grant its motion seeking leave to file interlocutory exceptions, find that Grant 
shares the same conflict as Byron, and conclude that Grant’s representation of the 
Charging Party violates the New York Rules of Professional Conduct.  It seeks an order 
directing the Charging Party to obtain alternate representation.   
The Charging Party argues that the Village’s motion should be denied because it 
is untimely pursuant to our Rules of Procedure (Rules), because the Village has not met 
the requisite showing of extraordinary circumstances for permission to file 
an interlocutory appeal, and because PERB lacks the authority to grant the relief sought 
by the Village.     
 For the following reasons, we deny the motion seeking leave to file 
interlocutory exceptions. 
 
                                            
2 Motion seeking leave to file interlocutory exceptions, at 2.   
3 Id. 
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DISCUSSION 
The Village’s motion seeking leave to file interlocutory exceptions was mailed to 
the Board on November 2, 2017 and was, therefore, timely filed with the Board pursuant 
to Section 213.4(a) of our Rules.  However, the Village did not provide proof of service 
on Attorney Grant, who, by then, had become the Charging Party’s representative.4  A 
letter was sent to the Village’s attorney on November 15, 2017, pointing out this 
omission and requesting proof that the motion seeking leave to file interlocutory 
exceptions and brief in support were timely served on Grant pursuant to PERB’s Rules.  
By letter dated November 17, 2017, the Village provided an affidavit of service stating 
that its motion seeking leave to file interlocutory exceptions and brief in support were 
sent to Grant via facsimile and mail on November 15, 2017.  
Initially, we find that the Village’s motion seeking leave to file interlocutory 
exceptions must be denied because of the Village’s failure to timely serve its motion and 
supporting brief on the opposing party.  Section 213.4(a) of PERB’s Rules require that a 
motion seeking leave to file interlocutory exceptions and supporting brief be filed within 
10 working days after the interim decision, order, or ruling that is being appealed.  The 
Rule also requires that the motion and brief “shall be served simultaneously on all other 
parties and proof of such service shall be filed with the board.”  Timely service upon all 
other parties is a necessary component for the filing of exceptions under the  
  
                                            
4 The Village did file proof of service on Byron and another attorney, Marilyn Berson.   
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Rules, and this timeliness requirement is strictly applied.5  The motion and supporting 
brief here were not served on the Charging Party simultaneously with the motion and 
brief sent to the Board.  In fact, the Charging Party was not served until 19 working days 
after the Assistant Director’s letter.  Thus, on the record before us, the Village’s motion 
and supporting brief were not timely served on the Charging Party and, therefore, must 
be denied.6 
Even assuming that the motion and brief had been timely served on the Charging 
Party, we would still deny Respondents’ motion seeking leave to file interlocutory 
exceptions.  As we have consistently held and as our Rules now require, we will not 
grant leave to file interlocutory exceptions to non-final rulings and decisions unless the 
moving party demonstrates extraordinary circumstances.7  We find that Respondents 
                                            
5 See NYCTA (Ayala), 50 PERB ¶3017, 3073 (2017); Transport Workers Union of 
Greater New York, Local 100, AFL-CIO (Waters), 49 PERB ¶3026, 3083 (2016); United 
Federation of Teachers (Hunt), 48 PERB ¶3005, 3012 (2015); State of New York 
(Commission of Correction), 47 PERB ¶3019, at 3058 (citing UFT (Pinkard), 44 PERB 
¶3011, 3042 (2011); UFT (Elgalad), 43 PERB ¶3028 (2010); see generally Honeoye 
Falls-Lima Cent Sch Dist (Malcolm), 41 PERB ¶3015 (2008); Town/City of 
Poughkeepsie Water Treatment Facility, 35 PERB ¶3037 (2002); Yonkers Fedn of 
Teachers (Jackson), 36 PERB ¶3050 (2003), dealing with the service of exceptions 
under § 213.2(a) of our Rules.  Prior to the revision of our Rules in August of 2017, this 
same rule applied to filing and service of interlocutory appeals.  
6 See, eg, (Fonseca), 50 PERB ¶3038 (2017); TWU (Waters), 49 PERB ¶3026, at 3083; 
UFT (Hunt), 48 PERB ¶3005, at 3012; UFT (Pinkard), 44 PERB ¶3011, at 3042. 
The Respondents’ assertion, in a letter dated November 14 and received by 
PERB on November 15, that it had not served Grant because it had not received any 
Notice of Appearance or Consent to Change Attorney is, at best, disingenuous, 
considering that the Respondents are disputing the Assistant Director’s decision to 
allow Grant to represent the Charging Party.  
7 See §213.4 (b)(1) of our Rules; Hyde Leadership Charter School - Brooklyn, 47 PERB 
¶3022, 3063 (2014); State of New York (Division of Parole), 40 PERB ¶3007, 3019 
(2007); City of Newburgh, 33 PERB ¶3031, 3084 (2000); UFT (Grassel), 32 PERB 
¶3071, 3168 (1999); Council 82, AFSCME, 32 PERB ¶3040, 3089 (1999); Town of 
Shawangunk, 29 PERB ¶3050, 3115 (1996); Mt Morris Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB ¶3085, 
3165-3166 (1993).         
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have failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant 
of interlocutory appeal here.   
The Respondents argue that allowing Grant to represent the Charging Party here 
would violate New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct.8  The Board has previously 
declined to administer or enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct.  In Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of Buffalo,9 the Board addressed a 
motion seeking to preclude the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility (the predecessor of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct).  The Board rejected the motion, holding that PERB would not enforce the 
Code of Professional Responsibility in the context of our proceedings.  As the Board 
explained, “[t]o ensure consistency in approach, enforcement of an attorney’s ethical 
responsibilities is best left to the professional bodies and the judicial system charged 
with that specific duty.”10   
The Village failed to distinguish or otherwise address this precedent in the motion 
seeking leave to file interlocutory exceptions and supporting brief and has given us no 
reasons to revisit these clear holdings.  Accordingly, and given that the ALJ’s ruling was 
fully consistent with our prior precedent, we find that the Village has failed to establish 
                                            
8 22 NYCRR § 1200.  
9 24 PERB ¶3033 (1991), confd sub nom Bd of Educ for the City Sch Dist of the City of 
Buffalo v Buffalo Teachers Federation, 191 AD2d 985, 26 PERB ¶7002 (4th Dep't 
1993).   
10 Id, at 3065.  See also Mohawk Valley Community College and County of Oneida, 45 
PERB ¶3050, 3124 (2012); Union-Endicott Cent Sch Dist, 28 PERB ¶3029, 3071 
(1995), confd sub nom Bd of Educ of the Union-Endicott Cent Sch Dist v NYS Public 
Empl Relations Bd, 233 AD2d 602, 29 PERB ¶7020 (3d Dept 1996); Amalgamated 
Transit Union, Local 1056, 24 PERB ¶3008, 3016 (1991). The body charged with 
enforcing the Rules of Professional Conduct is the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court.  
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extraordinary circumstances warranting consideration of an interlocutory appeal, and 
would deny the Village’s motion even if it had been timely served on Charging Party.   
DATED: December 18, 2017 
     Albany, New York 
 
 
